Because agency considerations have been such a prominent feature of the capital structure literature, we also introduce agency conflicts into our analysis by calculating the value of the debt that, instead of maximizing the total value of the levered firm, maximizes the utility of a risk-averse manager.
utility is given by a CRRA utility function that is defined over his entire wealth. The value process of the firm's assets (that is, the value of the cash flows from operations) follows geometric Brownian motion.
The model is in continuous time with 0 .
u T T < <
At time zero the value of the firm's assets is ( )
. V
Without debt in its capital structure, the firm's capital consists of NL N shares of stock with a total market value of ( ) ( ) 0 0 .
NL E V =
1 The value of the firm's assets, ( ), V t follows geometric Brownian 1 The subscript NL refers to quantities when the firm is not leveraged (that is, when it does not have debt in its capital structure). The subscript L refers to quantities when the firm is leveraged. 
V t dt div t dt
The value of δ is specified exogenously as a model parameter.
The manager makes a capital structure decision at time zero, which consists of choosing a level of debt that maximizes his expected utility at time .
u T The debt has a face value of L F and has a market value when it is issued at time zero of ( ) 0 .
L D
The debt pays a coupon at a constant annualized rate L C which is set so that the debt is priced at par, that is,
L L
F D =
The firm deducts its coupon payments from its taxes at an effective rate , τ and the tax shields of the debt at time zero have a value of ( ) 0 .
L TB
The debt has a protective covenant which specifies that if the asset value, at any time during the life of the debt [ ] 0,T , decreases to an exponential boundary, the firm is forced into bankruptcy.
2 Besides offering tractability, this default boundary form contains several default triggering mechanisms as special cases, e.g., the positive net-worth protected debt case in Leland (1994) and the constant default boundary case of Longstaff and Swartz (1995) . When default occurs, the stock becomes worthless and the debtholders 2 As in Black and Cox (1976) , our bankruptcy boundary increases through time at an exponential rate until it reaches the face value of the debt at the time that the debt matures. The boundary is intended to act somewhat like covenants in bond indenture agreements that give bondholders the right to seize assets when they are in danger of being lost. Huang and Huang (2003) discuss that firms often continue to operate even when their asset values fall below the face value of outstanding debt. On the other hand, at maturity, the firm's asset value must be at least as high as the face value of the debt to avoid default. Our choice of an increasing default boundary is designed to capture the idea that firms' ability to operate when firm value is below the face value of the debt declines as debt gets closer to maturity. Our choice of an exponential form is for tractability and is unlikely to affect our results significantly.
C-3 recover 1 BC α − of the levered value of the assets. The fraction of the value of the assets not recovered by the debtholders is assumed to be consumed in the bankruptcy process. The bankruptcy boundary is an exponential curve that increases at a rate g and is equal to the face value of debt at time . T Consequently, the bankruptcy boundary is described by ( ) . 
Note that although we have assumed a constant asset payout rate of δ , the dividend payout is timevarying and will be less for lower ( ) We assume that the manager cannot sell or hedge either his shares or his options. In addition, at time zero the manager has ( ) 0 NFW dollars of non-firm wealth. For simplicity, this wealth is assumed to grow at the risk-free rate. When the debt is chosen to maximize the manager's expected utility at time u T , this 3 Though our bankruptcy boundary is exogenous, cash infusions are not uncommon in models with an endogenous boundary (e.g., Leland, 1994) . Another possible modeling approach is to allow renegotiation when the firm hits the default boundary. See Francois and Morellec (2003) and Fan and Sundaresan (1999) for models with renegotiation.
C-4 utility is described by
where γ is a risk-aversion parameter and u T Wealth is the manager's total wealth at time .
u T
The value of the debt, the bankruptcy costs, and the tax shields of debt are computed from the probability density function for first hitting the exponential bankruptcy boundary. Let 
, 0 , , , , , *; 0 , , , , , *, T
C-5
Following Leland and Toft (1996) , the value of the debt at time zero is the sum of a contribution from the coupon, a contribution from the payment to debtholders if bankruptcy occurs, and the repayment of the face value at time T if bankruptcy does not occur: Another modeling decision involves the question of whether the firm should refinance the debt when it matures. We consider two alternative models: The first is a "static" model, in which the firm does not replace the maturing debt, and is therefore financed entirely with equity after time T. The second is a "dynamic" model, in which new debt is reissued when old debt matures. Since the dynamic C-6 framework seems a priori more appealing, and in fact Ju (1998 Ju ( , 2001 
Note that we have used the levered value of the remaining assets to price the debt in (C.8), but the unlevered value of the lost assets to compute the bankruptcy costs in (C.11). We use the unlevered value of the lost assets to compute bankruptcy costs because this corresponds to the cost to the original shareholders before the firm is levered. We also computed bankruptcy costs using the levered value of the lost assets. We omit these calculations, however, because the results using this approach are virtually identical to those from the approach that uses the unlevered value.
The interest tax shields, or tax benefits of debt, accrue to the firm as long as it has not gone bankrupt. Consequently, the interest tax shields of debt in the static model can be computed by ( )
The value of the equity is equal to the unlevered value of the assets plus the tax shields of debt minus the bankruptcy costs minus the value of the debt:
In order to compute the manager's time zero expectation of his utility at time , 
; 0 , , , , , , ; 0 , , , , , ,
Note that all terms on the right hand side of equation (C.17) are a function of
N is the number of shares after the proceeds of the debt are used to retire some of the original shares.
C.I.b. The dynamic model
Next we extend the model to a more realistic dynamic setting. If the firm has not gone bankrupt at the end of T years, the firm issues new T-year debt at time .
T The new debt has a coupon of
Similarly, as shown in Appendix C.A., all other securities will be scaled by a factor of ( ) ( )
, V T V
because at time T the firm is identical to itself at time zero, except that it is ( ) ( )
as large. The process of issuing new T-year debt when the old debt matures continues indefinitely unless the firm goes bankrupt. If bankruptcy occurs at time * t < T (before debt matures), we allow the debtholders to become the new shareholders and they optimally lever the remaining assets
after the bankruptcy process consumes BC
at the bankruptcy boundary.
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In this dynamic setting, the price of the debt is still given by equation (C.9). The firm value, however, will reflect the costs and benefits of the debt issued in the future. In determining the total tax shields and total bankruptcy costs associated with current and future debt issues, the following quantity is useful: 
The first term accounts for the effect of rebalancing at the debt maturity date, ,
T if there is no default between time zero and . T The second term accounts for the leveraging of the assets that remain after bankruptcy costs if default occurs before T . 4 We show in Appendix C.A. that the total tax shields and the total bankruptcy costs of debt are given by
Similar to equation (C.15), the value of the equity is equal to the unlevered value of the assets plus the tax shields of debt minus the bankruptcy costs minus the value of the debt:
Finally, the manager's utility in the dynamic model is given by 4 For more details, see equation (C.A.9), in Appendix C.A., and the discussion preceding it.
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The details for computing the manager's utility in this dynamic model are provided in Appendix C.A.
C.II. Calibrating the model
In choosing the amount of debt that will be issued, a face value, , L F of 10-year debt (i.e., 10 T = years) is chosen to maximize either the total value of the levered firm or the manager's expected utility one year in the future (i.e., 1 u T = ). The total value of the firm's assets before the firm is levered,
, is normalized to $100, which is divided among 100 shares, each worth $1. We assume that the manager of the firm owns 0.32 of a share of stock and a 1-year exchange traded European call option on an additional 0.38 share. 5 The strike price for the call option is set equal to the time zero value of a share of equity of the firm without debt, $1. For the base-case, the manager's non-firm wealth is assumed to equal the time-zero value of the shares that the manager owns, $0.32. Consistent with the literature, we assume the manager's risk aversion parameter γ equals 2.
6 Given these assumptions, calibration of the model requires estimates of (1) the risk-free rate, r, (2) the effective tax rate, , τ (3) the volatility of the total value of the firm, σ , (4) the debtholder bankruptcy recovery rate, ( )
the exponent of the exponential function characterizing the bankruptcy boundary, g, (6) the level of dividends, DivRate, paid by the firm, and (7) the drift parameter for the total value of the firm, µ . We estimate these parameters using data from the end of January 2001. To estimate the tax rate used to calculate the tax shields from the debt, we use data on estimated marginal tax rates (before interest expense) provided by John Graham, who constructed these estimates using the approach described in Graham (1996) . In particular, for the base case, we assume that the tax rate equals the median marginal tax rate of 34% for the 5,519 firms for which 1999 estimates are available.
The volatility of the total value of the firm's assets, σ , the debtholder bankruptcy recovery rate, ( )
, and the exponent of the bankruptcy boundary function, g, are selected to yield an expected recovery in bankruptcy equal to 45% of the face value of debt and a spread over the 10-year Treasury bond rate for the firm's debt that equals 1.90%, for a firm with the median debt to total capital ratio of 22.62% among firms in the Compustat database in 2000. The 45% recovery target is broadly consistent with recovery rates published by Hamilton, Gupton, and Berhault (2001 those that ensure that the model output matches the 1.90% spread over the Treasury bond rate and the 45% expected recovery in bankruptcy. Thus, they reflect the total direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy.
We set the dividend rate, DivRate, equal to 1.5% in the base case. Because this rate is stated as a percentage of the unlevered value of the firm, we use a number that is on the lower end of the 1.5% to 2.0% dividend yield paid by public firms at the beginning of 2001.
We select a value for the drift parameter of the firm, µ, by implementing an argument similar to one provided in Merton (1974) . We begin by formally writing the dynamics of the equity's value as ( )
By Ito's lemma and the dynamics of the firm under the physical measure given in equation (C.1), we can also write the dynamics for E as ( )
Matching the coefficients on the drift components of equations (23) and (24) 
We set E µ equal to 11.22% by assuming an equity risk premium of 6% over our risk free rate of 5.22%.
When the rest of the quantities on the right hand side of equation (C.25) are computed from the calibrated 7 The asset volatility, σ, in our model is the annual volatility of the returns of the firm's asset value. While the model is in continuous time and the parameter values, like the interest rate, r, and σ, are annualized, the spread of any finite maturity bond over a similar Treasury bond is consistent with the use of continuous time and annualized parameter values.
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values for our standardized firm with a debt to total capital ratio of 22.62%, the equation yields our base case value for µ of 10.63%. 
Panel A of

C.III. Optimal Capital Structure Estimates from the Manager's Perspective
Using the above parameters, we calculate the optimal capital structure from the manager's perspective by choosing the debt level that maximizes the value of his utility function rather than the total levered firm value. The results from this model are presented in Table C .2. When asset volatility is low, the manager prefers more leverage than do the shareholders (42.75% in Table C .2 vs. 40.71% in Table 2 (see main text)), indicating that the increase in the value of the manager's options associated with higher leverage outweighs the manager's dislike for risk when he chooses the firm's capital structure. On the other hand, when asset volatility is high, the value of the options is already quite high, even without any leverage. In this case, the effect of managerial risk aversion dominates the option effect and the manager chooses less leverage than the shareholders would like (6.39% in Table C .2 vs. 8.34% in Table 2 ). T is larger, there is more variability in the equity price at the time when the manager evaluates his utility. For low levels of asset volatility, the impact of this higher variability on the value of the manager's options outweighs his aversion toward taking risk. 8 In an elegant unified model incorporating tax shields and default costs of debt financing, as well as managerial incentives for empire-building, Morellec (2004) has shown that managerial discretion may also explain the observed low leverage ratios. In contrast to our model that emphasizes managerial risk-aversion, Morellec focuses on agency problems associated with the tendency to empire-build.
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For high levels of asset volatility, however, the effect of leverage on the value of the manager's options is relatively less important than his concerns regarding risk.
Even though there is little difference between the leverage values that maximize firm value (and hence shareholder value) in Table 2 and the leverage values that maximize manager utility in Table C .2, the fact that they are not identical indicates that there is a conflict between shareholders and managers. In this appendix we calibrate the manager's compensation package to reflect those typically observed in practice in order to investigate the size of the conflict. An interesting extension would be to study the compensation packages that are optimal from the point of view of the shareholders in the context of a model such as this one.
We also estimated the capital structure that maximizes the manager's utility for the 15 firms discussed in Section C of the main text. The value-weighted average maturity of the debt and cost of debt for each firm, estimates of each firm's marginal tax rate for 1999 (obtained from John Graham), and the actual stock and option holdings of each CEO are used in these calculations. The stock and option holdings for the CEO's are taken from the 2000 proxy statements filed by the sample firms with the SEC. Table C .3 reports the firm-specific model inputs, estimated asset volatility and bankruptcy parameters, as well as the actual, share value-maximizing, and manager utility-maximizing debt to total capital ratios for each of the 15 firms. While most of the utility-maximizing debt-to-total capital ratios are similar to the corresponding share value-maximizing ratios, they differ substantially in cases where the debt maturity is long. This is especially apparent for Ravenswood Winery and Mead in Table C .3. In cases with long maturity debt, the preference of stockholders for more debt, illustrated in Table 2 , is offset to a large extent by the managers' risk aversion. The values are for a manager with a risk aversion parameter of 2 and who owns 0.32 shares and options on 0.38 shares.
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Appendix C.A.
In this appendix we develop the dynamic model in more detail and then describe the procedure for computing the manager's utility at time .
u T
C.A.I. The dynamic model
To obtain ( ) ( ) ( )
, , and G T H T I T
9 in (C.5), (C.6), and (C.7), we require the first passage time density function. To compute it, we first define
One application of Ito's lemma under the risk-neutral measure yields From Ingersoll (1987) , the first-passage time density function ( ) f t for crossing the origin is given by
where ) (• n is the standard normal density function. Now, lengthy, but straightforward calculations
In these expressions, ) (• N is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Given ( ) ( ) ( )
, , and , G T H T I T the values of the debt, bankruptcy costs, and tax shields of the current debt are given by equations (C.9), (C.12), and (C.14), respectively. The total firm value in the static model, when debt is issued only once by the firm, is given by the value of the firm's unlevered assets plus the tax shields of debt (C.14) minus the bankruptcy costs (C.12)
We now turn our attention to the dynamic model. In this model the firm repeatedly and optimally issues T-year maturity debt until it goes bankrupt. Obviously, the optimal coupon for the new issues will depend on the firm value when the future debt is issued. We note, however, the following scaling property: If the optimal coupon of the first (initial) debt issue is L C , then the optimal coupon in future issues will be scaled by the ratio of the asset value ( ) V t when the new debt is issued to the initial asset value ( )
. V
The reason for this is that at time t the firm is identical to itself at time zero, except that it is ( ) ( )
as large because the asset value follows a proportional process (geometric Brownian C-22 motion). Therefore, if no bankruptcy has occurred by the time that the initial debt matures at T , the optimal coupon of the new debt will be
. Now, if bankruptcy occurs at T t < * , the asset value will be
. We allow the debtholders to become the new shareholders, and they optimally lever the remaining asset value (1-BC
after the bankruptcy process consumes
. Thus, the optimal coupon after bankruptcy reorganization is
In fact, all future issues of debt will be scaled by the ratio of the firm's asset value when the new debt is issued to its asset value when the old debt is issued.
Even though only the current issue of debt is outstanding at time zero, the tax shields and bankruptcy costs reflect all expected future debt issues. Let 
) represents the present value of the tax shields from the debt issue in each succeeding period.
To find φ , we require the conditional distribution of ( ) T V such that the firm has not gone bankrupt at time .
T Again, from Ingersoll (1987) we have the following conditional density function for 
(1 ) 
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The total levered firm value, 
The optimal capital structure is obtained by maximizing either the total firm value or the manager's utility. 
The debt where 'NBC' denotes that no bankruptcy has occurred and φ is the factor from equation (C.A.13) that is given by ( ) 
